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Abstract
If entrepreneurs have private information about factors influencing the outcome of an
investment, individual lending is inefficient. The literature emphasizes improvements
through non-market organizations that harness local information through peer monitor-
ing. I investigate the complementary question of designing a credit mechanism when
local information is limited, disabling peer monitoring. I show that a pooling mecha-
nism that does not rely on peer monitoring can implement a market for rights-to-borrow,
restoring efficiency. The mechanism achieves a strict Pareto improvement - providing
incentive for each type of agent to join. Further, even though the mechanism involves
pooling - and consequent implicit transfers from better types to worse types - it has
a “collective” feature that makes it immune to the Rothschild-Stiglitz cream-skimming
problem under competing contracts. Finally, the presence of even weak local informa-
tion implies that the mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal lenders. Thus
a local credit institution can emerge as an optimal response to the informational envi-
ronment even without peer monitoring. I apply the results to contracts offered by rural
moneylenders in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
The problem of excessive default in agrarian economies that distort formal credit markets,
and the emergence of remedial non-market institutions for credit are widely discussed is-
sues in the literature on development economics. If borrowers have private information
about factors influencing the outcome of an investment, individual lending can be ineffi-
cient. Many borrowers might use the loan to undertake projects with little chance of suc-
cess, raising the rate of default and causing the formal lending market to fail. This has lead
to the growth of informal moneylenders as well as a variety of non-market institutions such
as credit cooperatives, group lending arrangements with joint liability, and rotating savings
and credit associations(1).
The literature typically assumes that even though the formal lenders cannot observe project
quality or effort, the borrowers themselves have full information, and can potentially moni-
tor each other. In their insightful analysis of cooperative design, Banerjee, Besley, and Guin-
nane (1994) show how local information can be harnessed through peer monitoring. The
focus therefore is on making use of the abundant local information by creating incentives
for peer monitoring(2).
This paper explores a different route and presents a theory of a non-market credit mech-
anism that does not rely on peer monitoring. This shows that it is possible to construct a
theory of non-market credit as an optimal institutional response to the informational envi-
ronment even if borrowers do not have privileged knowledge about the characteristics of
their peers. The paper relates the results to evidence on rural moneylending collected by
Aleem (1993).
The paper analyzes a model in which the return from a project depends both on its intrinsic
quality and on the effort of the agent who operates the project - and both quality and effort
are the agent’s private information. As Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) point out, there are
(1)See Besley (1995b) for a succinct outline of the literature. See also Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a
detailed survey of the literature on group lending.
(2)Following the classification in Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, a second view in the literature is the long
term interaction view, which stresses investment incentives generated through repeated local interaction, using,
presumably, local knowledge about the actions of agents. Thus while the approach described above uses
explicit monitoring, the long-term interaction view is based on implicit monitoring through repeated-game
strategies.
2four major problems facing lenders - gaining knowledge about the quality of borrowers
(adverse selection), ensuring correct choice of effort once the loan is made (moral hazard),
learning about of the outcome of investment (costly state verification), and enforcement
of repayment. The analysis here focuses on the first two problems - ensuring only high
quality borrowers invest and take the right effort. I assume that the outcome of investment
is observable (so state verification is not a problem), and repayment is enforceable.
The problem is as follows. The “internal” design must ensure that only agents with high
enough productivity invest, and all investing agents adopt high effort. Given the internal
design, the “sustainability” problem is to ensure that (a) all agents choose to participate in
the mechanism, and (b) the equilibrium contract is proof against competing contracts, so
that no other lending contract can skim the cream (successfully attract away the best quality
borrowers and earn a positive profit).
The main result of this paper is that even without monitoring, it is possible to sustain a par-
ticular pooling mechanism that does not rely on either peer monitoring or local information
in general, but solves informational problems by implementing an appropriate market. Fur-
ther, the mechanism is budget balanced and sustainable in the sense described above, so
that all types have the incentive to join and even though the mechanism involves pooling
and consequent transfers from better types to worse types, it has a “collective” feature that
makes it proof against poaching of the better types by competing contracts, avoiding the
Rothschild-Stiglitz cream-skimming problem.
So far the contract has no special institutional features that make it a non-market credit insti-
tution. A distinguishing feature of non-market credit organizations is that they incorporate
some local information. The paper shows that if even weak local information (say, some ad-
vantage in initially weeding out completely frivolous applicants) is added to the model, the
mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal lenders. Thus a local credit organization
can be an optimal response to the informational environment even without peer monitoring.
The intuition behind the pooling mechanism is as follows. The market failure under in-
dividual lending is caused by the fact that access to credit is free and thus even borrowers
who have low quality projects and intend to take low effort find it worthwhile to participate.
However, they impose a negative externality on other borrowers leading to a distorted (or
even non-existent) credit market. A potential solution is trading in a market for rights-to-
borrow. But this is not feasible - since everyone has free access to credit, no one would buy a
3right to borrow at a positive price. This paper shows that a credit mechanism can implement
such a market using a simple budget-balanced mechanism. The mechanism requires the or-
ganization to disburse a certain amount of funds initially (a fraction of the amount needed
by each agent), charge a fee for access to further credit and allow partial default. The ba-
sic intuition for welfare improvement through the mechanism lies in the fact that the initial
loan plus the possibility of default creates the right level of endogenous collateral(3), while the
credit-access fee balances the budget.
The structure of the mechanism that delivers efficiency is broadly consistent with evidence
collected by Aleem (1993) on rural moneylending. An initial loan coupled with the possibil-
ity of default are part of the reported lending mechanism. These are precisely the features
exploited here. The evidence is discussed further in section 8.
Finally, the paper extends the model to consider whether monitoring can have a role in this
setup. Suppose investment takes place over a unit length of time, and the credit organi-
zation can monitor an agent over any fraction of time. Such “partial monitoring” ensures
that agents who otherwise take low effort must take high effort while being monitored -
incurring part of the cost of high effort. Suppose such partial high effort has no impact on
output. The paper shows that even such apparently useless monitoring complements the
mechanism and extends its scope. The intuition is that such monitoring raises partially the
effort cost for the types who would otherwise adopt low effort. This reduces the underlying
“free-access-to-credit” problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and section 3 shows the
market failure under individual lending. Section 4 describes a credit mechanism and sec-
tion 5 shows that this solve the market failure. Section 6 discusses sustainability. Section 7
explains how a weak local information advantage implies that a local institution is uniquely
sustainable. Section 8 discusses application of the results to rural moneylending. Section 9
extends the model to explore the role of monitoring in this setup. Section 10 relates the
mechanism analyzed here to the literature, and section 11 concludes. Proofs not in the body
of the paper are collected in appendix A.
(3)This is discussed further in section 10.
42 The Model
There is a continuum of economic agents. Each agent owns a project, operating which re-
quires an indivisible investment of 1 unit of the numéraire good. Each agent has a zero
endowment of this good.
An agent can either earn a safe return or engage in production. Throughout the paper,
“return” implies gross return. I normalize the safe return to 1.
The return from production is a random variable that can take two values 0, and R > 0. The
state where the realized value is R, is called “success,” and the other state is called “failure.”
The probability of success of a project depends on the project’s type as well as the effort of
the agent. Project type is a random variable p with a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
The effort of the agent could be high or low. If the agent takes high effort (use better quality
private inputs), the success probability of the project is given by p, the project’s type. If, on
the other hand, the agent takes low effort, the success probability is reduced to αp, 0 < α < 1.
Low effort is cost-less, while high effort has a utility cost of g > 0.
The type of a project as well as the level of effort exerted are the agent’s private information.
However, the distribution of project types and the moral hazard parameter α are public
information. Further, investment is observable (which rules out direct consumption of a
loan).
The Benchmark
I assume that the first-best level of investment is always strictly positive (i.e. the first-best
cutoff is strictly less than 1). The first-best investment cutoff is given by pfb whereRpfb−g = 1,
i.e.
pfb =
1 + g
R
. (2.1)
IfR < 1+g, the efficient solution is no investment. We preclude this trivial case by assuming
R > 1 + g. (2.2)
53 Individual Lending and Market Failure
The model here features a continuum of risk neutral agents as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
and deMeza and Webb (1987). As in those models, separation of types is not possible under
individual lending contracts, and the only solution is to offer the same contract to all types
(i.e. a pooling contract). For the sake of completeness, this point is clarified formally in
appendix B.
A general form of an individual lending contract specifies a payment TS by the agent if the
project succeeds, and a payment TF if it fails. However, agents are subject to limited liability,
which implies that TF 6 0.
Efficiency requires that all types p > pfb invest with high effort, and all types p < pfb do not
invest. For any type p to invest and take high effort, the following incentive constraint must
be satisfied:
pR− [pTS + (1− p)TF ]− g > αpR− [αpTS + (1− αp)TF ] .
Let p∗ be the marginal project for which the incentive constraint binds. Simplifying the
above, the incentive cutoff p∗ is defined implicitly by:
p∗(R− TS) + p∗TF = g
(1− α) . (3.1)
Thus efficiency requires (a) p∗ = pfb and (b) any p < p∗ does not invest.
For the latter condition to be true, it must be that the participation constraint for p < p∗ does
not hold. Since types p < p∗ take low effort if they participate, the required condition is
αpR− [αpTS + (1− αp)TF ] 6 0, which implies that αp(R− TS)− (1− αp)TF 6 0.
However, since TF 6 0, from equation 3.1, R − TS > 0. Thus αp(R − TS) − (1 − αp)TF > 0.
Thus the condition above does not hold and the outcome is necessarily inefficient.
In fact, whenever there is any measure of types who have an incentive to participate with
high effort (i.e. the incentive cutoff is p∗ < 1), the participation constraint for all types p < p∗
holds as well. Thus all such types invest and adopt low effort. Thus in equilibrium, if
investment takes place at all, it is characterized by extreme overinvestment (all types invest)
coupled with low effort taken by some types.
The basic problem is that the lower types who exert low effort participate in investment, and
impose a negative externality on the higher types.
64 The Credit Mechanism
What is a solution to the inefficiency? As noted in the last section, the root of the problem
is the negative externality imposed by agents who cannot be excluded from participating
with a low effort. If there were a market where agents could buy and sell their right to
borrow, agents with low types would prefer to sell their right to borrow rather than invest
- which would reduce the externality. However, given free access to a credit market, such a
market cannot easily arise - no one would buy a right to borrow from another person. The
mechanism below shows how such a market can be implemented.
4.1 The Mechanism
The organization running the mechanism borrows from the formal lending sector and lends
to its members. By design, the mechanism is budget-balanced. Thus it always repays its
loan. It is assumed that the formal lending sector is competitive. The organization can
therefore borrow at a competitive rate (here normalized to zero).
Parametrized by three variables L, pi and ρ, and denoted by M(L, pi, ρ), the mechanism is
described by 1-3 below.
1. Initially, offer a loan of L < 1 to all borrowers. An agent can either choose to accept or
exit. The agents who accept simultaneously decide whether to borrow a further (1−L)
and invest, or decide to not invest.
Let θI denote the proportion of agents who choose to become investors. Let θL = 1−θI .
2. A borrower who wants access to further credit (further than the L above) must invest
(recall that investment process is observable) and pay 1/p (where p is the average prob-
ability of success) plus a credit-access fee of pi, both payable in the success state. The
specified payment in the failure state is 0.
3. Any borrower who does not want to invest must repay
(
1− θI/θLρ
)
L where θI/θLρ ∈
[0, 1]. Note that for any θI/θLρ > 0, the mechanism allows (at least partial) default
(4).
(4)It is being implicitly assumed, as under individual lending, that once an agent accepts a loan he cannot
simply “take the money and run.” If this were possible, enforcement issues would be central. As mentioned
74.2 Solving the Game
The extensive game analyzed here is as follows. At time 0, all agents simultaneously decide
whether to join the mechanism or stay out. At time 1, all agents who join participate in the
mechanism.
In what follows, I assume that all agents join initially. I then analyze the outcome of the
mechanism in this subgame. The next section then takes up the question of whether joining
is part of an equilibrium in the whole game.
An agent would decide to invest and take high effort subsequently if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
• High-effort payoff exceeds payoff from defaulting on initial loan:
(Participation Constraint) p
(
R− pi − 1
p
)
− g > θI
θL
ρL. (4.1)
• High-effort payoff exceeds low-effort payoff: p
(
R− pi − 1/p
)
− g > αp
(
R− pi − 1/p
)
,
which simplifies to
(Incentive Constraint) p
(
R− pi − 1
p
)
> g
1− α. (4.2)
The participation and incentive constraints summarize the incentive properties of the mech-
anism.
Implementation is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Implementation) The mechanismM(L, pi, ρ) is said to implement a cutoff p∗ < 1
if, in equilibrium, the agents with type p > p∗ invest and take high effort and the agents p < p∗ do
not invest.
The following result characterizes the cutoffs the mechanism can implement.
Lemma 1. Suppose L satisfies
gα
1− α 6 L < 1, pi =
2p∗L
1− p2∗
, ρ =
p∗
1− p∗ , and p∗ ∈ [0, 1] solves
p∗
(
R− 2
1 + p∗
− pi
)
− g = L. (4.3)
Then the mechanismM(L, pi, ρ) implements p∗, and is budget balanced.
in the introduction, here the focus is on information asymmetries (adverse selection and moral hazard) rather
than enforcement or state verification.
8While the formal proof is in appendixA.1, the idea is simple. Allowing default on the initial
loan makes it more attractive for low types to default and not invest rather than invest, and
setting the credit access fee pi at the right level, the loss through default can be recovered
from the high types who invest. Equation 4.3 characterizes the investment cutoffs that can
be implemented through this mechanism.
4.3 Interpreting the Mechanism
The mechanism as a market for rights-to-borrow
To interpret the mechanism, note that it separates the low-type-and-potentially-low-effort
agents from the high-type-and-potentially-high-effort agents. With individual lending, sep-
aration is impossible. Everyone can borrow freely at the going market rate, and since only
the success state matters, even for very low types it is better to borrow, invest and take
low effort than not participating at all. The credit mechanism, on the other hand, separates
agents into two groups - the first group decides to be defaulters and thus cannot invest,
while the second group decides to access further credit and invest. An investor must pay
1/p+ pi in the success state. A payment of 1/p ensures zero profit for the mechanism if L = 0.
The additional amount, pi, can be thought as a fee for access to further credit, which raises
funds to pay for the default by non-investors. Thus a defaulter virtually “sells” his right to
borrow to the investors at a positive “market-clearing” price (given by θI/θLρL). In this sense
the mechanism implements a market for rights-to-borrow.
“Collective” nature of mechanism
The repayment by non-investors depend on the ratio θI/θL, determined by the aggregate de-
cision of agents. This “collective” nature of payoff to non-investors is important in avoiding
some standard problems with competing individual contracts. This issue is explored further
in section 6.2.
Defaulters as internal lenders
The current mechanism allows default by non-investors. While this is a standard feature of
rural moneylending (see the discussion in section 8), internal lending (lending by current
9non-investors to current investors) is a standard feature of credit cooperatives. Default by
non-investors in the current mechanism can be reinterpreted as internal lending. An alter-
native description of the mechanism is as follows. Initially, all agents get a loan of L < 1.
Agents either decide to invest (and borrow a further (1− L)with the specified repayments)
or become internal lenders, and lend L to the organization. An internal lender receives a
payment of θI/θLρL.
5 Attaining First-Best
Let
L∗ =
(R− (1 + g))2
R2 + (1 + g)2
. (5.1)
Since R > (1 + g) by assumption, 0 < L∗ < 1.
Let α(R, g) be the solution for α to L∗ =
gα
1− α . Thus α(R, g) =
1
(1 + g/L∗)
. It can be easily
checked that that this is increasing in R and decreasing in g. The result below shows that
whenever α < α(R, g), the mechanism can restore first-best.
Theorem 1. (Attaining First-Best) Let L∗ be given by (5.1), pi∗ = 2pfbL
∗
/(1− p2
fb
), and ρ
∗ =
pfb/(1− pfb). For any 0 < α < α(R, g), the mechanismM(L
∗, pi∗, ρ∗) satisfies budget balance and
implements the first-best cutoff pfb .
6 Sustaining the Credit Mechanism
A mechanism is defined as “sustainable” if the following conditions are satisfied.
1. (Participation) Each agent optimally choosing to join the mechanism is an equilibrium.
2. (Proof against competing contracts) No other lending contract can attract away some
fraction of borrowers and earn a positive profit - i.e. no other contract can skim the
cream.
I show below that both conditions are satisfied. These properties, coupled with the fact
that efficiency can be attained show that a credit organization with a collective feature is an
optimal institutional response to the informational environment.
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6.1 Participation Incentives
The last section assumed all agents join, and analyzed the outcome of the mechanism. Here
I analyze whether agents joining is part of the equilibrium. I show that indeed each type of
agent has an incentive to join.
The following result shows that the mechanismmakes each type strictly better off compared
to individual lending. Thus if all others join, joining is the strict best response for any agent.
Therefore all agents participating in the mechanism is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. (Welfare Comparison) For any α < α(R, g), for any type p ∈ [0, 1], the payoff under
the mechanism strictly exceeds that under individual lending.
Obviously, the transfer makes the lower types better off than if they were to invest. More
interestingly, the investors gain also in spite of paying an extra fee. The intuition is that
elimination of low effort improves greatly the average probability of success, and lowers the
payment required from successful projects to recover the original loan.
6.2 Competition in contracts: Cream Skimming
The mechanism here uses a pooling contract. In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a pooling
equilibrium cannot survive competition in contracts - another contract can skim the cream -
i.e. attract only the better types away and make a positive profit. Is there scope for a similar
cream skimming by a competing contract here? I show that the answer is no. The intuition
lies in the fact that payment made to non-investors is tied to the proportion of investors.
Thus a contract that tries to compete away the high types (i.e. investing types) would also
attract the non-investors. This “collective” feature differentiates the mechanism here from
pooling equilibria in Rothschild and Stiglitz.
To hope to make a positive profit by attracting away higher types, any competing contract
must lower the payment that these investing types pay in the success state. Types simulta-
neously decide whether to switch or not to switch. Iteratively eliminating strictly dominated
strategies, I show below that all types (both investors and non-investors) switch to the new
contract, leaving the new contract with a negative payoff. Thus cream skimming is not pos-
sible.
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Let T ∗S denote the payment in the success state under the original mechanism. Suppose a
competing contract is offered with a specified payment of T ∗S −  in the success state, and 0
in the failure state, where  > 0. Then all types p > pc, where pc is such that pc (R− T ∗S + ) =
L + g, will take up the new contract and invest with high effort.Thus we can eliminate the
dominated strategy “not switch” by types p > pc.
Recall that payoff of non-investors (given by the allowed default amount) is
(
θI/θL
)
ρL.
Knowing that types p > pc have a dominant strategy to switch, each type below pc faces
a payoff of 0 (as now θI = 0) by choosing to stay. By switching and investing, any type
p ∈ (0, pc) earns a strictly positive payoff. Thus we can eliminate “not switch” by types
p < pc.
Therefore all types would take up the new contract and invest. This lowers the average prob-
ability of success so that in fact the new contract earns a negative payoff. This is formally
verified in the proof of the result below in appendix A.4.
Theorem 2. The mechanism specified in section 4.1 is sustainable so that all agents participating in
the mechanism is an equilibrium, and the mechanism is proof against competing contracts.
The result shows that the “collective” nature of payments to defaulters avoids the Rothschild-
Stiglitz type cream-skimming problem caused by competing contracts.
7 The Mechanism as a Non-Market Institution
The results above show that the mechanism addresses the problem of sustainability and
implements the efficient solution. So far the contract has no special institutional features
that make it a non-market credit institution. A distinguishing feature of such institutions is
that they incorporate some local information.
Let us extend the model to incorporate some local information. So far, the projects in the
model are of type p, where p is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
These can be thought of as “potentially worthwhile” projects (i.e. projects that can poten-
tially have a high probability of success). Let us now augment the model and suppose that
there is also a mass of “frivolous” projects with a zero chance of success.
Assume that local information allows a local organization distinguish between potentially
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worthwhile projects and frivolous projects. However, an organization without local infor-
mation faces a cost c > 0 to evaluate each project initially to screen out the frivolous projects.
Given that all projects (potentially worthwhile and frivolous) must be screened before the
frivolous projects can be isolated, the total cost of screening can be high. Thus even a small
local information advantage can translate into a large cost advantage for a local organiza-
tion.
The next step is to show that in the presence of even such weak local information, a local
organization is the unique optimal institution.
Suppose a formal sector bank uses the mechanism. Since the bank does not have access
to local information, any such collective would either include the frivolous projects with
success probability 0, or screen them out at a cost. In either case, the investing types have
to pay a higher fee compared to a local organization that can screen out the low quality
projects using local information. This creates scope for a profitable offer by a competing
local contract - it can offer a credit contract with the same L and ρ, but a slightly lower
pi. This will attract away all investing types - and thus also all non-investing types (for the
same reason as in section 6.2), but since the original contract must havemade a non-negative
profit (otherwise it would not be offered), the new local contract can clearly make a strictly
positive profit. Thus a formal sector bank using the mechanism cannot survive competition
in contracts, and therefore such an organization is not sustainable.
This proves the following result.
Theorem 3. In the presence of even weak local information, the mechanism is not sustainable under
the formal sector. Thus a local credit organization is the optimal institutional response to informa-
tional environment.
8 Comparison with evidence on rural moneylending
Aleem (1993) presents a detailed picture of rural moneylending in the Chamber area in Pak-
istan. He finds that there are a large number of informal lenders operating in the same area
(60 in the Chamber area). The key aspects of the evidence he presents and comparability
with the features of the theory presented here are summarized below.
Aleem finds evidence to show that “interest rates are close to the average costs of lending
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and above marginal cost in the Chamber market.” The data is consistent with average cost
pricing and free entry. This is precisely the setting here.
Second, while there is considerable variation in the methods used by individual lenders,
there are some important common features. If a farmer passes screening, he gets a small
initial loan for one season before the lender satisfies all his legitimate credit needs. The
mechanism here relies on exactly such a feature - there is an initial loan, and those who do
not default get further credit. The possibility of default helps separate the high types from
lower types.
Third, average cost pricing implies that the cost of default is borne by the investors. The
quantity and extent of initial loans to borrowers must depend on the moneylender’s an-
ticipation of the proportion of non-defaulters. This gives rise to a “collective” feature that
allows the mechanism here to survive competition from any competing contract.
Finally, the paper extends the model to include some local information. Aleem reports that
a formal credit market with uniform and relatively low rates of interest coexists with an
informalmarket that charges awidely dispersed set of relatively high rates. Informal lenders
generally give unsecured loans but face a lower risk of default than formal lenders, who
normally lend against collateral but rarely foreclose. Thus the formal sector is clearly at a
disadvantage compared to a local lender. Each lender faces a considerable cost of evaluating
projects - with no reduction in this cost even after several years. This suggests that each
moneylender has some local information advantage about his clientele compared to other
lenders operating in the area. This is consistent with the local information aspect of the
extended model in this paper, which helps to show that a local non-market institution arises
as the unique optimal response to the informational environment.
The moneylenders also monitor the projects to some extent. So far the paper has not consid-
ered whether there is a role for monitoring in the current setting. The question is taken up
in the following extension.
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9 Partial Monitoring: An Augmented Mechanism
Is there a role for monitoring in this model? To answer this question, note the cases in which
the mechanism above cannot attain efficiency. For severe enough moral hazard (i.e. α <
α(R, g)), the mechanism above restores first-best. However, for high values of α (low moral
hazard), the mechanism cannot ensure first best. Of course, in such cases the distortion is
not great to start with. Still, the distortion is positive and there is scope for improvement.
The problem is the constraint L ≥ αg/(1− α). For high values of α, L needs to be very high
- making default very attractive, and investment very unattractive. To resolve the problem,
we need a way to keep L low yet allow α to be high. I show that this is possible if a little bit
of monitoring is added to the model.
To introduce the idea of partial monitoring, suppose, first, that the organization running
the mechanism can also monitor each borrower. To keep the analysis simple, suppose such
monitoring is costless. Now suppose production takes place over a unit interval of time.
Over any measurable interval of time, the operator of a project can take either low or high
effort. Usual (full) monitoring then refers to monitoring effort over the entire unit interval
and results in high effort throughout, and an output corresponding to high effort. This is
the kind of monitoring the literature assumes at the outset. Partial monitoring refers to
monitoring over any interval of length m < 1. This results in high effort on that interval,
and depending on incentives, low or high effort on the rest. To make the conclusions about
the usefulness of partial monitoring sharp, and to distinguish it from the usual ideas of
monitoring, I assume that partial monitoring has no direct benefit.
Assumption: For any project of type p ∈ [0, 1], if in the production process low effort is
taken for any strictly positive interval of time, the expected gross return is αpR.
The expected gross return from any project of type p is pR under high effort, and αpR under
low effort. An agent who takes low effort, when monitored partially, would take high effort
over the monitoring interval, but low effort over the rest of time. By assumption, the output
would not improve at all, ensuring partial monitoring has no direct benefit.
Even though it has no direct benefit, monitoring here increases the cost of participating
with low effort (an agent who otherwise takes low effort must take high effort while being
monitored, incurring a cost over that interval). This reduces the underlying externality by
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reducing the “free-access-to-credit” problem. This is the intuition behind the usefulness of
partial monitoring.
9.1 The Augmented Mechanism
Denote the augmentedmechanism by M̂(L, pi, ρ,m). This is identical toM(L, pi, ρ) except for
the following addition. Any agent who obtains further credit in order to invest, is monitored
for an interval of time of lengthm < 1.
The incentive properties of the augmented mechanism are as follows. The participation
constraint is the same as in the original mechanism (given by (4.1)). The new incentive
constraint is given by p
(
R− pi − 1/p
)
− g > αp
(
R− pi − 1/p
)
−mg, which simplifies to
(Modified Incentive Constraint) p
(
R− pi − 1/p
)
≥ (1−m)g
1− α .
The following lemma is very similar to lemma 1, and characterizes the cutoffs that the aug-
mented mechanism can implement. The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 1, and
is omitted.
Lemma 3. Suppose 0 ≤ m < α is such that L satisfies g(α−m)
1− α 6 L < 1, pi and ρ are as
in lemma 1, and p∗ ∈ [0, 1] solves equation (4.3). Then the augmented mechanism M̂(L, pi, ρ,m)
implements p∗, and is budget balanced.
Attaining First-Best The result below shows that the augmented mechanism can imple-
ment first-best for any α ∈ (0, 1). Letm∗ be given by the following:
m∗ =
{
0 for 0 < α ≤ α(R, g), and
α− (1− α)L∗/g otherwise. (9.1)
where L∗ is given by equation (5.1). Clearly, m∗ < 1 for any α < 1, implying partial moni-
toring. Also, m∗ > 0 only for α > α(R, g). Thus for α ≤ α(R, g) the augmented mechanism
coincides with the mechanism without monitoring.
Theorem 4. (Attaining First-Best Under Augmented Mechanism) Let (L∗, pi∗, ρ∗) be as in
theorem 1, and let m∗ be given by equation (9.1). For any α ∈ (0, 1), the augmented mechanism
M̂(L∗, pi∗, ρ∗,m∗) satisfies budget balance and implements the first-best cutoff pfb .
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Sustainability The augmented mechanism generates the same incentives to participate as
the original mechanism. The result below follows directly from lemma 2. Note that, as
expected, the only change is in the scope of the mechanism - the improvement now holds
for all α ∈ (0, 1) rather than only for low values of α.
Corollary 1. For any α ∈ (0, 1), for any type p ∈ [0, 1], the payoff under the mechanism strictly
exceeds that under individual lending.
Finally, the augmented mechanism is proof against competing contracts for exactly the same
reason as before.
10 Related literature
Before discussing related literature, it is worth clarifying the intuition for the welfare im-
provement achieved through the mechanism. All agents are given an initial loan. An agent
who abstains from investing and defaults on the initial loan, obtains a transfer. Thus the
initial loan acts as own wealth/collateral(5), which induces the agents to be more “responsi-
ble” in choosing whether to invest. Thus endogenous collateral at the right level adjusts the
incentive to invest, and separates investors and abstainers.
In their insightful analysis of cooperative design, Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994)
show how local information can be harnessed through peer monitoring. In their model,
there is a productive agent who borrows funds and invests, and a non-investing agent who
can lend own funds to the cooperative, and potentially monitor project choice by the in-
vesting agent. By setting the extent of internal borrowing (borrowing from non-investing
agent), the extent of the monitor’s liability, and the interest rate paid on the internal funds,
the cooperative induces the non-investing agent to monitor investment optimally. The cen-
tral objective in their paper is to generate incentives for peer monitoring. Here, on the other
hand, there is no monitoring. The objective is to generate endogenous collateral which cre-
ates incentives for non-participation. As noted in section 4.3, the default can be interpreted
(5)Collateral and own wealth are formally the same. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume the existence of collat-
eral, but no own wealth, while deMeza and Webb (1987), as well as this paper assume the reverse. However,
as noted by both Stiglitz and Weiss (footnote 8), and deMeza and Webb (footnote 1), ability to offer collateral
is formally the same as increase in own wealth.
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as an internal loan - making this a theory of credit cooperatives that do not rely on mon-
itoring. However, the paper also shows how even apparently useless monitoring can be
useful.
Further, while Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994) focus only on the incentive to monitor
and invest, this paper also addresses the question of sustainability - it explains why agents
participate and why the contract is not vulnerable to competing contracts.
The fact that information asymmetries can cause the formal individual lending to be dis-
torted is very well known. There are famous credit rationing results by Jaffee and Russell
(1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Jaffee and Russell focus on incentives for strategic
default by some borrowers, and the resulting constraint on loan size. The analysis here,
however, focuses entirely on investment incentives and assumes that enforcement is not a
problem. This is perhaps not inappropriate in analyzing non-market local credit institutions.
In the Stiglitz-Weiss model, on the other hand, the focus is indeed on investment incentives.
However, deMeza and Webb (1987) show, an inefficiency arises only if the form of contracts
is restricted a-priori to debt contracts. Without this restriction, the optimal contract in the
Stiglitz-Weiss model is an equity contract, which restores first best investment. deMeza and
Webb show that if projects are ranked by probability of success, a debt-contract is optimal,
and under optimal (individual lending) contracts there is overinvestment. Here the qual-
ity of projects are ranked just as in the deMeza-Webb model and adds also an effort choice
decision by agents, unsurprisingly, the market outcome for individual lending is distorted.
In the mechanism here, investors subsidize non-investors in equilibrium. Subsidization
across types also occurs in the insurance model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). However,
the nature of the cross-subsidizations is very different, and it is worth noting the differences.
First, the setting of credit market here is very different from the insurance problem. In the
setting of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the utility functions of the good and bad types sat-
isfy the single crossing (i.e. Spence-Mirrlees sorting) property(6). This creates the possibility
of a separating contract - and indeed, if an equilibrium exists, it is of this type. In contrast, in
this model, as in Stiglitz andWeiss (1981) and deMeza andWebb (1987), there is a continuum
of risk neutral agents - and as in those models, separation is not possible under individual
(6)The marginal rate of substitution between incomes in the two states (in one of which a loss occurs) is
uniformly higher for the type with a relatively lower probability of loss (the “good” type).
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lending contracts. The only solution is pooling(7).
While a separating individual lending contract does not exist, the credit mechanism achieves
separation between investors and non-investors by creating endogenous collateral and in-
ducing low types to not invest. Such a mechanism would not work in the insurance context,
where the risk faced is not consequence of any action (e.g. choosing to invest), but exoge-
nous, and thus the incentive to take the best possible insurance contract by the “bad” types
is unaffected by transfers.
However, while the nature of the problem is different, cross-subsidization gives rise to the
same problem of sustainability under competing contracts as that in Rothschild-Stiglitz.
What prevents a competing contract from attracting away the better types? The solution
here lies in a “collective” feature of the mechanism that differs from the contracts considered
by Rothschild and Stiglitz. The proposedmechanism specifies a payoff for the non-investing
types that depend upon the aggregate decisions, so that it is impossible to attract away only
investing types. Thus a competing contract must accommodate all types, and still do better.
In this model, since a local organization has extra screening ability, it can attract away all
types from the formal sector and still do better, but the reverse is not true.
11 Conclusion
Informational problems combinedwith lack of sufficient collateral often distort formal credit
markets. The literature typically assumes local information is complete, and focuses on
making use of this information through peer monitoring.
This paper constructs a theory of a non-market credit institution that does not rely on mon-
itoring. The paper shows that even without monitoring, a simple credit mechanism can
implement the efficient solution. The mechanism provides incentive for each type of agent
to participate, and despite using a pooling solution, is proof against poaching of the better
types by a competing contract.
The market failure is caused by the fact that the lower types who exert low effort in equilib-
rium participate in investment, and impose a negative externality on the higher types who
exert high effort in equilibrium. Through the device of an initial loan and the possibility of
(7)To clarify this point further, I have included a formal discussion in appendix B.
19
default, the mechanism prices the externality, and balances its budget by charging an appro-
priate fee for access to credit from the investors. The mechanism raises the payoff of every
type, which explains participation incentives. Further, the payoff of the defaulters rely on
the proportion of investors. This “collective” aspect implies that any attempt to skim the
cream ends up attracting all types, making such an attempt unprofitable.
The paper also extends the model to consider the role of monitoring in this setup. It shows
that adding partial monitoring of borrowers by the credit organization can extend the scope
of themechanism. This is true even if suchmonitoring has no direct benefit in raising output.
The intuition is that such monitoring raises partially the effort cost for the types who would
otherwise adopt low effort. This reduces the underlying “free-access-to-credit” problem.
Finally, if some local information advantage (e.g. a lower cost of initially screening out friv-
olous projects) is added to the model, the mechanism cannot be successfully used by formal
lenders. Thus a local credit organization that does not rely on peer monitoring emerges as
an optimal solution to the market failure.
The paper compares the optimal design to evidence on credit design in rural moneylending.
As Aleem (1993) reports, the behavior of moneylenders is consistent with average cost pric-
ing. Further, an initial loan coupled with the possibility of default are part of such arrange-
ments. These are precisely the features exploited here.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If p∗ is the investment cutoff, θI = 1−p∗, and θL = p∗. Thus θI/θLρ = 1. Thus the participation
constraint (given by equation 4.1) reduces to
(Participation Constraint) p
(
R− pi − 1
p
)
> L+ g. (A.1)
From the fact that L > αg/(1 − α), we get L + g > g/(1 − α), and thus the participation
constraint (given by equation (A.1)) binds at a higher p compared to the incentive constraint
(given by equation (4.2)).
This implies that the high-effort cutoff is the type p∗ for which the participation constraint
binds exactly:
p∗(R− pi − 1
p
) = L+ g. (A.2)
To ensure that no one participates with low-effort, note that any such agent must have a type
p for which the incentive constraint does not hold - i.e. p(R − pi − 1/p) < g/(1− α). For any
such p, the payoff from investing (with low effort) is αp(R − pi − 1/p) < αg/(1 − α). Since
L > αg/(1− α) by construction, any such agent would prefer to default rather than invest.
Thus if p∗ is the investment cutoff, all p > p∗ take high effort. This implies that the average
probability of success is given by p = E(p|p > p∗) = (1 + p∗)/2. Substituting the value of the
average probability of success in equation A.2 above, the resulting equation is the same as
equation (4.3).
Thus the high-effort cutoff satisfies equation (4.3), and there are no agents who participate
with low effort. This proves that under the conditions mentioned in the statement of the
lemma, the mechanism implements the required cutoff.
Finally, budget balance needs to be checked. Given the investment cutoff p∗, a fraction (1−
p∗) of types participate and each gets a loan of 1. Thus the total loan made by the mechanism
is (1 − p∗). Since θI/θLρ = 1, the total transfer to non-investors is p∗L. The expected receipts
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are
Prob(p > p∗)E(p|p > p∗)(pi + 1
p
) =
(
pi +
1
p
)∫ 1
p∗
pdp
=
(
2p∗L
1− p2∗
+
2
1 + p∗
)
(1− p2∗)
2
= p∗L+ (1− p∗),
which is exactly equal to the total of transfers and loans advanced. Thus the budget deficit
is zero. 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Clearly, L∗ < 1. Further, for α < α(·, ·), L∗ > gα/(1 − α). Also, pi∗ and ρ∗ are equal to
pi and ρ specified in lemma 1 for p∗ = pfb . Finally, substituting the value of L
∗ and pi∗ in
equation (4.3), solving for p∗, and discarding the negative solution: p∗ = (1 + g)/R = pfb .
Thus, from lemma 1 it follows directly that for α < α(r, g),M(L∗, pi∗, ρ∗) implements pfb , and
satisfies budget balance. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Step 1. First, note that under any optimal individual lending contract, TF = 0. From limited
liability, TF 6 0. If TF < 0, this only dilutes incentives as follows. As TF becomes more
negative, from equation (3.1), p∗ increases. Now, the measure of the projects undertaking
high effort is (1 − p∗), and that of projects undertaking low effort is p∗. Thus an increase in
p∗ distorts aggregate effort further. So the optimal choice is to set TF = 0.
Step 2. Second, any type taking low effort under an individual lending contract benefits
strictly under the mechanism. To see this, note that types p < p∗, where p∗ is the high effort
cutoff given by equation (3.1), take low effort under an individual lending contract. From
equation (3.1), putting TF = 0, p∗(R − TS) = g/(1 − α). Using this, the payoff of type p∗
is p∗ (R− TS) − g = αg/(1 − α). Thus any type p < p∗ (recall that any such type takes low
effort) earns a payoff of αp (R− TS) = α p
p∗
g
(1− α) <
αg
1− α . Under the mechanism, such a
type can earn at least θI/θLρ
∗L∗ = L∗ (this follows from the fact that θI = 1 − pfb , θL = pfb ,
ρ∗ = pfb/(1− pfb)), and L∗ > αg/(1− α) for α < α(r, g).
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Step 3. It remains to show that each type taking high effort (i.e. p > p∗) benefits strictly
under the mechanism. The payoff from individual lending for any such type is given by
Ym(p) = p(R− 1
p
)− g.
Now, the average probability of success p under individual lending is given by
p = Prob(p > p∗)E(p|p > p∗) + Prob(p < p∗)E(αp|p < p∗)
=
∫ 1
p∗
pdp+
∫ p∗
0
αpdp
=
1
2
− (1− α)p
2
∗
2
<
1
2
.
Using the last inequality,
Ym(p) < p(R− 2)− g. (A.3)
LetD(p) denote the difference between the payoff of type p under the credit mechanism and
individual credit. There are two possibilities to consider.
First, suppose p∗ < pfb . Consider any type p such that p∗ 6 p < pfb .
D(p) = L∗ − Ym(p)
> L∗ − Ym(pfb)
> L∗ − pfb(R− 2) + g
=
2(1 + g)3
R((1 + g)2 +R2)
> 0,
where the third step uses (A.3). Second, suppose p∗ is either lower than or greater than pfb ,
and consider any type p such that p > pfb .
D(p) = p
(
R− pi∗ − 2
1 + pfb
)
− g − Ym(p)
> p
(
R− pi∗ − 2
1 + pfb
− (R− 2)
)
= p
(
2(1 + g)2
(1 + g)2 +R2
)
> 0,
where the second step uses (A.3). This completes the proof. 
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The discussion in section 6.1 and lemma 2 prove the first part. As for being proof against
competing contracts, the discussion in section 6.2 shows that a competing contract must
attract all types. Since all types invest, there is some cutoff p∗ (the type for which the incen-
tive constraint holds with equality) such that types below p∗ adopt low effort. The average
probability of success p is therefore given by
p = Prob(p > p∗)E(p|p > p∗) + Prob(p < p∗)E(αp|p < p∗)
=
∫ 1
p∗
pdp+
∫ p∗
0
αpdp =
1
2
− (1− α)p
2
∗
2
<
1
2
.
From theorem 1, the payment by an investor in the success state under the original mecha-
nism is (2/(1 + pfb) + pi
∗). Thus the profit of the competing contract, denoted by picc is given
by:
picc = p
(
2
1 + pfb
+ pi∗ − 
)
− 1
<
1
2
(
2
1 + pfb
+ pi∗
)
− 1
=
pfbL
∗
1− pfb2
+
1
1 + pfb
− 1
=
pfb
1 + pfb
(
L∗
1− pfb
− 1
)
=
pfb
1 + pfb
(
R2 −R(1 + g)
R2 + (1 + g)2
− 1
)
< 0.
where the third and final steps use the values of pi∗ and L∗, respectively, from theorem 1.
The final step also uses the fact that pfb = (1 + g)/R. Since picc < 0, the competing contract is
unprofitable. This completes the proof. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
The addition of m∗ ensures that for any α ∈ (0, 1), L∗ ≥ g(α −m)/(1 − α). The rest follows
directly from the proof of theorem 1. Thus for any α ∈ (0, 1), the augmented mechanism
M̂(L∗, pi∗, ρ∗,m∗) satisfies budget balance, and implements pfb. 
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Appendix B
Asmentioned in section 3 (as well as footnote (7) in section 10), this section clarifies the point
that in the model considered here (featuring a continuum of risk neutral types), separation
of types is not possible under individual lending contracts, and the only solution is a pooling
contract. This property is exactly the same as in the models of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and
deMeza and Webb (1987).
Let us ignore the moral hazard problem for the time being. Suppose two different contracts
T ≡ (TS, TF ) and t ≡ (tS, tF ) are offered. Recall that limited liability implies TF 6 0, and
tF 6 0. Suppose there is some cutoff p∗ ∈ [0, 1], such that types p > p∗ choose the contract
T , and types p < p∗ choose the contract t. For this to happen, it must be that TS 6 tS , and
−TF 6 −tF . This is because higher types care more about the payment in the success state
and lower types care more about the receipt (negative payment) in the failure state.
In what follows I show that if the two contracts are different (so that at least one of TS 6= tS
and TF 6= tF is satisfied), and if T earns zero profit, then tmust earn a strictly negative profit.
First, note that the incentive constraints are as follows.
p(R− TS) + (1− p)TF > p(R− tS) + (1− p)tF for p > p∗, (B.4)
p(R− tS) + (1− p)tF > p(R− TS) + (1− p)TF for p < p∗. (B.5)
Can both contracts earn a zero profit? Suppose the expected profit from the contract T is
zero. Then Prob(p > p∗)E (pTS + (1− p)TF |p > p∗) = 0, i.e.∫ 1
p∗
(pTS + (1− p)TF ) dp = 0.
Simplifying, TS − TF = − 2TF
1 + p∗
. Now, the inequality (B.4) holds with equality for type
p = p∗. Using the above in (B.4) for p = p∗, and simplifying,
p∗(tS − tF ) = TF (1− p
∗)
(1 + p∗)
− tF . (B.6)
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Finally, the profit from the contract t (denoted by V (t)) is given by
V (t) = Prob(p < p∗)E (ptS + (1− p)tF |p < p∗)
=
∫ p∗
0
(ptS + (1− p)tF ) dp
=
p∗
2
[
p∗(tS − tF ) + 2tF
]
. (B.7)
Using equation (B.6), the above becomes
V (t) =
p∗
2
[(
1− p∗
1 + p∗
)
TF + tF
]
.
If 1 − p∗ = 0, this implies that all types adopt contract t. Similarly, p∗ = 0 implies all types
adopt T . Thus for non-trivial separation, 0 < p∗ < 1. Since TF 6 0 and tF 6 0, and
0 < p∗ < 1, the right hand side of equation (B.7) above is non-positive. Thus V (t) 6 0, and
further, V (t) < 0 if any one of TF and tF is strictly negative.
Thus, for contract t to earn a zero profit, it must be that TF = tf = 0. But then the incentive
compatibility condition (B.4) reduces to TS 6 tS , and (B.5) reduces to TS > tS . The only way
the two inequalities can be satisfied simultaneously is if TS = tS . But then the two contracts
are not different.
Finally, adding amoral hazard problem on top of the adverse selection problem only changes
the probability of success for some projects from p to αp, and changes the value of the cutoff
p∗. These changes only make it harder for the low-types contract t to earn a zero profit - and
thus leaves the conclusion unchanged.
This shows that separation is impossible, and pooling is the only solution.
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